International Economic Sanctions Are Not Zero-Sum Games: There Are Only Losers

Dadkhah, Kamran and Zangeneh, Hamid (1998): International Economic Sanctions Are Not Zero-Sum Games: There Are Only Losers. Published in: Iranian Journal of Trade Studies Quarterly , Vol. 1, No. 5 (1998): pp. 1-14.

Abstract

Ostensibly, the US sanctions have been enacted to bring pressure on Iran to abandon her support of terrorism and subversion of the region, efforts to produce weapons of mass destruction, and opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process. But it is said that domestic politics, particularly, the 1996 presidential elections and the power struggle over foreign policy between the Congress and the President may have resulted in adopting the harsh measures. In this paper we argue that embargoes and sanctions outlined above are detrimental to the United State’s leadership and harm American economic interests, and in all likelihood, they will not change Iran’s behavior.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Iranian economy; Iranian Economic, US Sanctions; cost of sanctions; Benefits of sanctions; Effectiveness of Sanctions; D’Amato law
• Subjects: F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy; F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F51 - International Conflicts ; Negotiations ; Sanctions

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