Vérification des conditions d'efficacité dans la production chez Bell Canada

Mirucki, Jean (1980): Vérification des conditions d'efficacité dans la production chez Bell Canada.

Abstract

The Averch-Johnson hypothesis of over-capitalisation is tested, in this work, using Bell Canada data from the 1952-76 period. The cost minimization conditions are checked by using a Cobb-Douglas production function, with an optional index of technology, while the 1952-76 data sample has been segmented into 8 sub-periods, to check for the influence of the random nature of any given sample. The main results of this paper are, first of all, that the Cobb-Douglas production function provides, overall, a satisfactory description of the production decisions of the firm, showing constant returns to scale in 83 % of the case. Secondly, 11 out of the 13 Student-t tests reject the hypothesis that the firm was minimizing its costs. In all cases, the results indicate that the bias favored the production factor (K). Finally, the most dramatic variations in the results come from the use of segmented periods. The Averch-Johnson hypothesis of over-capitalisation is tested, in this paper, using Bell Canada data from the 1952-76 period. The cost minimization conditions are checked by using a Cobb-Douglas production function, with an optional index of technology, while the 1952-76 data sample has been segmented into 8 sub-periods, to check for the influence of the random nature of any given sample. The main results of this paper are, first of all, that the Cobb-Douglas production function provides, overall, a satisfactory description of the production decisions of the firm, showing constant returns to scale in 83 % of the case. Secondly, 11 out of the 13 Student-t tests reject the hypothesis that the firm was minimizing its costs. In all cases, the results indicate that the bias favored the production factor (K). Finally, the most dramatic variations in the results come from the use of segmented periods.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Checking the conditions of efficient production in Bell Canada
• Language: French
• Keywords: averch-johnson effect; overcapitalisation
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities > L96 - Telecommunications; L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L51 - Economics of Regulation

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