Price jitters: Do markets punish political stocks?

Ghosh, Saibal (2011): Price jitters: Do markets punish political stocks?

Abstract

The paper examines the impact of firms exhibiting political connection on their stock market performance. The results appear to suggest that the performance of ‘political’ stocks has been significantly weak. This is apparent in simple univariate tests that compare the political stocks across various industry categories or even comparisons of political versus apolitical stocks. The regression analysis indicates that the returns on political stocks are on average, over 20% lower as compared to stocks without any political association.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: political connection; buy-and-hold abnormal returns; India
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill; P - Economic Systems > P5 - Comparative Economic Systems > P52 - Comparative Studies of Particular Economies

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