L’impact du conseil d’administration sur la performance financière des entreprises Tunisiennes.

Bouaziz, Zied and Triki, Mohamed (2012): L’impact du conseil d’administration sur la performance financière des entreprises Tunisiennes.

Abstract

The Board of Directors plays a key role as a mechanism of internal corporate governance. Indeed, its effectiveness is dependent on the presence of several factors, the most important are related to characteristics that relate primarily to the independence of its members, board size, combining the functions of decision and control and the degree of independence of the audit committee and gender diversity of the board. To test the validity of our hypothesis, which states the existence of a deterministic characteristic of the board on financial performance measured by three different ratios, namely ROA, ROE and Tobin's Q, we have developed three linear regression models. Our empirical validation was conducted on a sample of 26 companies listed on the Tunisian stock exchange Tunis (Tunis Stock Exchange) over a period that spans four years (2007- 2010). The estimated models show satisfactory results showing the importance of the impact of board characteristics on financial performance of Tunisian companies.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: The impact of the Board of directors on the financial performance of Tunisian companies.
• Language: French
• Keywords: Board of Directors - financial performance -board size-the accumulation of functions-diversity of the board
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G38 - Government Policy and Regulation

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