Old lady charm: a comment

Signorino, Rodolfo (2012): Old lady charm: a comment.

Abstract

I start from Nicola Giocoli’s acute rational reconstruction of current US antitrust debate which shows that there really is no shortage of plausible explanations to the Chicago persistent appeal puzzle. Each explanation, taken in isolation, is, at best, only partial. In my view, the persistent appeal of Chicago antitrust owes much to the enduring grip of the equilibrium end-state notion of competition within top US Economics Departments and to the (alleged) resilience of market competition, absent entry/exit barriers, in the face of Type II Errors committed by antitrust Agencies.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Chicago school of law and economics, Type I and Type II Errors, entry barriers and horizontal merger regulation
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D40 - General; L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies

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