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The Socially Optimal Policy Choices by the Supreme Court – A Strategic Analysis

Mallick, Indrajit (2012): The Socially Optimal Policy Choices by the Supreme Court – A Strategic Analysis.

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Abstract

Abstract

This paper discusses a number of important problems regarding administration of justice in different legal areas and jurisdictions across the legal hierarchies in different countries throughout the world. It is argued that the Supreme Courts can address these problems through strategic use of its policy instruments. The paper discusses a number of important and pressing problems plaguing the courts all over the world. These problems range from litigation explosion, delay (backlogs) and caseload problems in courts, corruption in the judiciary, problems of judicial review by a Supreme Court, inadequate standards of review, suboptimal legal innovations brought about by the judiciary and inefficiently designed judicial hierarchies. I argue that it is only the Supreme Court, through strategic use of its policy instruments, can bring about solutions to these problems and the desirable results.

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