Alwasiak, Stanislaw and Lewandowska-Kalina, Monika and Kalina, Lech and Kowalewski, Oskar and Mozdzen, Michal and Rybinski, Krzysztof (2013): What Determines State Capture in Poland?
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Abstract
In this paper we examine the determinants of ex-ante state capture analyzing all the legal acts that have been passed in the period 1990-2011 in Poland. We find that during this the majority of legal acts were passed with the aim to satisfy the interest of particular groups. Furthermore, the regression analysis shows that the likelihood of state capture increases during the period of economic growth and local elections. The likelihood of state capture, however, declines during presidential elections. The results we attribute to different interests of political parties in the period of local and presidential election. Finally, we find that the state capture increased over the years in Poland. Additionally, we show that the EU accession did not prevent state capture in Poland. In contrast, the financial crisis of 2007 resulted in a wake-up effect and the likelihood of state capture declined in Poland.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | What Determines State Capture in Poland? |
English Title: | What Determines State Capture in Poland? |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | law, corruption, state capture, public interest, transition country, Poland |
Subjects: | H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H40 - General H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods H - Public Economics > H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt > H62 - Deficit ; Surplus K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law P - Economic Systems > P3 - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions > P37 - Legal Institutions ; Illegal Behavior |
Item ID: | 47057 |
Depositing User: | Oskar Kowalewski |
Date Deposited: | 17 May 2013 14:53 |
Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 16:50 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/47057 |