Constitution, Institutions and Models for Economic Growth in Nepal

Bhattarai, Keshab (2016): Constitution, Institutions and Models for Economic Growth in Nepal.

Abstract

Nepal made significant progress in removing monarchy and terrors of Maoists in the last decade. It however lacks a stable solution of speedier economic growth and development as the major political parties are still struggling to institutionalize the new political framework set up by the new constitution of Nepal that was promulgated by the Constitution Assembly of Nepal (CAN-II ) for the federal democratic republic of Nepal on 20 September 2015. Madesh based parties did not accept the new constitution, this caused an undeclared embargo by India. Nepalese economy crippled by the mighty earthquake of April 2015 got further paralyzed due to this blockage. This has slowed down the process of demarcation of provinces, election of provincial assemblies and government, election of the national government. Setting up strategy for growth and development in Nepal with the multiparty structure with focus on broader objectives of national development, alleviation of poverty and speedier economic growth and design of programmes suitable to multi-ethnic, multi-climatic and multi-cultural and multi-linguistic inclusive frameworks would be possible only when the new set up is complete. Nepal should stick to a dynamic model of growth and development for a decentralized economy to update on beliefs that can transform the nation improving well-being of all people in Nepal.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Nepal's new constitution, growth model of Nepal, economic develoment
• Subjects: O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O5 - Economywide Country Studies; P - Economic Systems > P5 - Comparative Economic Systems

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