Workers' enterprises in the case of arts production

Cuccia, Tiziana and Cellini, Roberto (2007): Workers' enterprises in the case of arts production.

Abstract

This paper shows that the standard result according to which labour-managed firms produce a lower amount of output, as compared to profit-maximising firms, is reversed if production per se gives utility and the workers’ membership of labour-managed firms is set prior to market decisions. Under the same hypotheses, the labour-managed firms set a higher product quality than the profit-oriented ones, ceteris paribus. The considered hypotheses are particularly relevant for the case of the performing arts sector, so that the presence of labour-managed firms should be particularly welcomed in this sector.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Institution: University of Catania
• Language: English
• Keywords: workers'enterprises; labour managed firms; arts
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L8 - Industry Studies: Services > L82 - Entertainment ; Media; L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L23 - Organization of Production

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