How Do Indian Voters Respond to Candidates with Criminal Charges : Evidence from the 2009 Lok Sabha Elections

Dutta, Bhaskar and Gupta, Poonam (2012): How Do Indian Voters Respond to Candidates with Criminal Charges : Evidence from the 2009 Lok Sabha Elections.

Abstract

We use data for the 2009 Lok Sabha elections to examine the response of voters to candidates who have reported that they have criminal charges against them. Our empirical results show that voters do penalise candidates with criminal charges, but the magnitude of the penalty decreases if there are other candidates in the constituency with criminal charges. The vote shares are positively related to candidate wealth, with the marginal effect being higher for the candidates with criminal charges. Moreover, candidates with criminal charged also have greater wealth.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Elections, India
• Subjects: P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems > P16 - Political Economy

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