Liu, Haiyang (2014): The Unbalanced Physical Movements of International Trade.
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Abstract
The goods produced in developed nations are often of higher quality, advanced technology and better design, hence goods even with little physical mass have higher value than goods produced in developing nations. This means that if the payment is balanced between developed and developing nations, the physical mass must be unbalanced. As a result, developed nations will become increasingly heavier, and the northern hemisphere where developed nations are clustered will also become more and more heavy. The earth will be reshaped like a ice-cream. Using customs data we confirm this conjecture.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | The Unbalanced Physical Movements of International Trade |
English Title: | The Unbalanced Physical Movements of International Trade |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Balance of Payment, Imbalance of Physical Movement, International Trade |
Subjects: | F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F14 - Empirical Studies of Trade F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F18 - Trade and Environment F - International Economics > F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business > F20 - General |
Item ID: | 54163 |
Depositing User: | prof haiyang LIU |
Date Deposited: | 07 Mar 2014 19:25 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 20:34 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/54163 |