Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

Heller, Yuval and Solan, Eilon and Tomala, Tristan (2010): Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information. Published in: Games and Economic Behaivor , Vol. 74, No. 1 (January 2012): pp. 222-234.

Abstract

This paper studies extensive form games with perfect information and simultaneous moves, henceforth called games with public information. On this class, we prove that all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained without mediator by cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: correlated equilbirium, distributed computation
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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