A Note on Natural Gas Market Evolution in Light of Transaction Cost Theory

Arora, Vipin (2012): A Note on Natural Gas Market Evolution in Light of Transaction Cost Theory.

Abstract

This paper attempts to address some common questions regarding the evolution of global natural gas markets through application of transaction cost theories.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: natural gas, evolution, transaction cost, contracts
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D40 - General; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q4 - Energy > Q40 - General

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