Utilizing List Exchange and Non-directed Donation through “Chain” Paired Kidney Donations

Roth, Alvin E. and Sonmez, Tayfun and Unver, Utku and Delmonico, Francis and Saidman, Susan L. (2014): Utilizing List Exchange and Non-directed Donation through “Chain” Paired Kidney Donations. Published in: American Journal of Transplantation , Vol. 11, No. 6 (November 2006): pp. 2694-2705.

Abstract

In a list exchange (LE), the intended recipient in an incompatible pair receives priority on the deceased donor waitlist (DD-waitlist) after the paired incompatible donor donates a kidney to a DD-waitlist candidate. A non-directed donor’s (ND-D) kidney is usually transplanted directly to a DD-waitlist candidate. These two established practices would help even more transplant candidates if they were integrated with kidney paired donation (KPD). We consider a scenario in which the donor of an LE intended recipient (LE-IR) donates to a compatible KPD intended recipient (KPD-IR), and the KPD donor (KPD-D) donates to the waitlist (an LE-chain). We consider a similar scenario in which an ND-D donates to a KPD-IR and the KPD-D donates to the DD-waitlist (an ND-chain). Using data derived from the New England Program for Kidney Exchange (NEPKE) and from OPTN/SRTR recipient-donor distributions, simulations are presented to evaluate the potential impact of chain exchanges coordinated with KPD. LE donors (LE-D) and ND-D who are ABO-O result in the highest number of additional transplants, while results for ABO-A and B donors are similar to each other. We recommend that both LE and ND donations be utilized through chain exchanges.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Kidney Exchange
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D47 - Market Design

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