Soldatos, Gerasimos (2014): Indirect Tax Incidence under Inelastic Underground Economy Demand. Forthcoming in: Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies , Vol. 7, No. 3 (2015)
Preview |
PDF
MPRA_paper_64598.pdf Download (355kB) | Preview |
Abstract
This paper demonstrates theoretically that a profit tax does not affect the distribution of the firm’s operations between the official and the underground economy. Or, if the firm was initially operating only officially, direct taxation of its business would not be a reason to go underground. Indirect taxation in the form of a sales tax does influence an already existing mix of official and underground activities, favoring the latter. And, it does constitute a reason to “go underground” for an otherwise fully official business. This is a thesis robust to market structure changes and to introducing tax evasion in the usual sense, provided the underground demand is inelastic. The tax authority can still collect the planned tax revenue through a combination of a cash-flow tax with indirect taxation, under only consumer-surplus loss by the underground customer.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
---|---|
Original Title: | Indirect Tax Incidence under Inelastic Underground Economy Demand |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Inelastic underground demand, Business-tax shift, Tax policy |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E2 - Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy > E26 - Informal Economy ; Underground Economy H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance |
Item ID: | 64598 |
Depositing User: | Gerasimos T. Soldatos |
Date Deposited: | 27 May 2015 06:02 |
Last Modified: | 27 Sep 2019 01:40 |
References: | Aureo, P. & Scheinkman, J. (2008). The informal sector, Penn Institute for Economic Research Working Paper 08-018. [Available at / http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/economics.sas. upenn.edu/files/working-papers/08-018.pdf] Bernardi, L. (2013). Recent findings regarding the shift from direct to indirect taxation within the EA-17, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica Working Paper 663. [Available at http://www.siepweb.it/siep/images/joomd/1401050783663.pdf] Charmes, J. (2012). The informal economy worldwide: Trends and characteristics. Margin: The Journal of Applied Economic Research, 6(2), 103-132. Dillén, M. (1995). Corrective tax and subsidy policies in economics with Bertrand competition. Journal of Public Economics, 58(2), 267-282. Doerrenberg, P. & Duncan, D. (2014). Tax incidence in the presence of tax evasion, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Discussion Paper No 8137. [Available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp8137.pdf] Edwards, C. (2013). Replacing the corporate income tax with a cash-flow tax. Cato Journal, 23(2), 291-318. Fortin, B., Lacroix, G. & Montmarquette, C. (2000). Are underground workers more likely to be underground consumers? Economic Journal, 110, 466, 838-860. Gillis, T. & Kannekens, W. (2014). Corporate and indirect tax rate survey 2014, KPMG International Cooperative, Switzerland. [Available at http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/ IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/corporate-indirect-tax-rate-survey-2014.pdf] Guesnerie, R. & Laffont, J.-J. (1978). Taxing price makers. Journal of Economic Theory, 19(2), 423-455. Harberger, A. (1964). Taxation, resource allocation, and welfare, in The Role of Direct And Indirect Taxes in the Federal Revenue System, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kanniainen, V. & Panteghini, P.M. (2013). Tax neutrality: Illusion or reality? The case of entrepreneurship. FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, 69(2), 167-193. Karp, L.S. & Perloff, J.M. (1989). Estimating market structure and tax incidence: The Japanese television market. Journal of Industrial Economics, 37(3), 225-239. Koehne, S. & Kuhn, M. (2015). Optimal taxation in a habit formation economy. Journal of Public Economics, 122, 32-39. Konrad, K.A., Morath, F. & Müller, W. (2014). Taxation and market power. Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'Economique, 47(1), 173-202. Peitz, M. & Reisinger, M. (2009). Indirect taxation in vertical oligopoly, SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 255. [Available at http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13297/1/255.pdf] Schmitt-Grohé, S. & Uribe, M. (2003). Optimal fiscal and monetary policy under imperfect competition, NBER Working Papers No 10149. [Available at http://www.nber.org/papers/ w10149.pdf] Singh, A., Jain-Chandra, S. & Mohommad, A. (2012). Inclusive growth, institutions, and the underground economy, IMF Working Paper 12/47. [Available at https://www.imf.org/external /pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp1247.pdf] Torregrosa, R., (1999). Balanced budget multiplier, imperfect competition and indirect taxation, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (IVIE) Working Papers Series EC No. 2. [Available at http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasec/wpasec-1999-02.pdf] Wang, H., (2011). Optimal indirect taxation under imperfect competition, Peking University, China Center for Economic Research Working Paper No E2010016. [Available at http://hwang.ccer.edu.cn/Tax%20201105.pdf] Windebank, J., (2004). Demand-side incentives to combat the underground economy: Some lessons from France and Belgium. International Journal of Economic Development, 6(2), 54-75. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/64598 |