Consistency in PERT problems

Bergantiños, Gustavo and Valencia-Toledo, Alfredo and Vidal-Puga, Juan (2016): Consistency in PERT problems.

Abstract

The program evaluation review technique (PERT) is a tool used to schedule and coordinate activities in a complex project. In assigning the cost of a potential delay, we characterize the Shapley rule as the only rule that satisfies consistency and other desirable properties.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: PERT problem; consistency; delay
• Subjects: B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B4 - Economic Methodology; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C0 - General; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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