The effects of School Accountability on Teacher Mobility and Teacher Sorting

Gjefsen, Hege Marie and Gunnes, Trude (2016): The effects of School Accountability on Teacher Mobility and Teacher Sorting.

Abstract

Does school accountability change the teacher composition in schools? We exploit a nested school accountability reform to estimate the causal effect of accountability on teacher mobility and teacher sorting. In 2003, lower secondary schools in Oslo became formally accountable to the school district authority. In 2005, a value added measure of student achievement in lower secondary schools also became public information. Both when using a double and a triple difference estimator, we find significantly increased teacher mobility. Almost all teachers that moved left the teaching sector entirely. Non-stayers were largely replaced by high-ability teachers, yielding a positive sorting effect after the second part of the reform.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: school accountability, teacher turnover, teacher sorting, difference-in-difference-in-difference
• Subjects: I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I2 - Education and Research Institutions; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor

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