Non-Use Values and the Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources

Ferrara, Ida and Missios, Paul (1997): Non-Use Values and the Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources. Published in: Ecological Economics , Vol. 25, No. 3 (1998): pp. 281-289.

Abstract

It has long been recognized in economics that individuals can derive benefits from a resource stock without directly or indirectly utilizing that resource. Such non-use values, including existence values and bequest values, however, are often ignored in models of resource management. In this paper, a simple, two-country model of the management of a renewable resource is developed in which at least one country has a non-economic interest in the conservation of the fish stock to examine the impact of such a non-use value on the end-of-period harvest and self-enforcing sharing rule. The model shows that this non-lucrative pursuit serves to decrease the total allowable catch for each period at the expense of the catch share of the more conservation-oriented country, a result is consistent with the September 1995 decision by NAFO ending the dispute between Canada and the European Union over turbot.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: fisheries management, environment, non-use values
• Subjects: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation > Q22 - Fishery ; Aquaculture; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation > Q28 - Government Policy

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