Honesty and Informal Agreements

Dufwenberg, Martin and Servátka, Maroš and Vadovič, Radovan (2016): Honesty and Informal Agreements.

Abstract

We develop, and experimentally test, models of informal agreements. Agents are assumed to be honest but suffer costs of overcoming temptations. We extend two classical bargaining solutions -- split-the-difference and deal-me-out -- to this informal agreement setting. For each solution there are two natural ways to do this, leaving us with 2x2 models to explore. In the experiment, a temptations-constrained version of deal-me-out emerges as the clear winner.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: agreement, bargaining, behavioral economics, contract, deal, experiment, honesty, lost wallet game, negotiation, temptation
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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