Driouchi, Ahmed and Harkat, Tahar (2016): Knowledge Economy, Global Innovation Indices, Rents and Governance in Arab Economies.
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Abstract
This paper sheds light on the relationship between knowledge, innovation, rents from natural resources and governance in world economies with focus on Arab countries. Two major analytical frameworks are used with the first based on the use of knowledge indicators while the second is on the Global Innovation index (2010-2016). Both models confirm the negative effects of rents and the positive roles of good governance, on knowledge and innovation. Arab countries appear to exhibit clearly these effects with higher emphasis on governance indicators. Also, Arab countries appear to exhibit a model that is statistically different from the one of all countries. This work complements that of Driouchi (2014a and 2014b) with the inclusion of the Global Innovation Index data 2010-2016.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Knowledge Economy, Global Innovation Indices, Rents and Governance in Arab Economies |
English Title: | Knowledge Economy, Global Innovation Indices, Rents and Governance in Arab Economies |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Keywords: Rents, natural resources, governance, knowledge economy, global innovation |
Subjects: | O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O13 - Agriculture ; Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment ; Other Primary Products O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation > Q28 - Government Policy |
Item ID: | 73507 |
Depositing User: | Ahmed Driouchi |
Date Deposited: | 07 Sep 2016 08:06 |
Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 09:56 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/73507 |