Psychology into economics: fast and frugal heuristics

Schilirò, Daniele (2015): Psychology into economics: fast and frugal heuristics.

Abstract

The present essay focuses on the fast and frugal heuristics program set forth by Gerd Gigerenzer and his fellows. In particular it examines the contribution of Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) ‘Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of Bounded Rationality’. This essay, following the theoretical propositions and the empirical evidence of Gigerenzer and Goldstein, points out that simple cognitive mechanisms such as fast and frugal heuristics can be capable of successful performance in real world, without the need of satisfying the classical norms of rational inference.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: behavioral economics; heuristics; biases; fast and frugal heuristics
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D0 - General; D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics > D10 - General; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D80 - General

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