Ethics and Market Design

Li, Shengwu (2017): Ethics and Market Design. Forthcoming in: Oxford Review of Economic Policy

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between ethics and market design. It argues that market design should not rely wholly on preference utilitarianism in order to make ethical judgements. It exposits an alternative normative framework—informed neutrality between reasonable ethical positions.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Market Design, Ethics, Welfare Economics
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D47 - Market Design; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D60 - General; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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