Antimonopolska politika: predlog rešenja

Begović, Boris and Bukvić, Rajko (1998): Antimonopolska politika: predlog rešenja. Published in: Ekonomika , Vol. 34, No. 6-8 (1998): pp. 160-163.

Abstract

Serbian. U radu se na osnovu analize postojećeg antimonopolskog zakonodavstva u našoj zemlji i ukazivanja na njegovu neadekvatnost daju osnovne sugestije i smernice za izradu novog zakonodavstva, kao osnove za delotvornu politiku razvoja i zaštite konkurencije. lstaknuti su osnovni problemi koje novo zakonodavstvo mora da obuhvati: stvaranje tržišne moći, odnosno monopola i drugih nesavršenih tržišnih struktura, procenjivanje efekata horizontalnih i vertikalnih integracija na postojeće rržišne strukture, formiranje adekvatnog antimonopolskog tela, s jasno definisanim nadležnostima i načinom rada, kriterijumima i procedurama za odlučivanje, sa strogo utvrđenim sastavom tela i mandatom njegovih članova, i uz striktno poštovanje načela javnosti njegovog rada. Naravno, pri tome je nužno izbeći mogućnost koju sadašnje zakonodavstvo daje, naime da članovi antimonopolskog tela budu birani iz redova tzv. istaknutih privrednika, dakle iz redova onih koji treba da budu regulisani. Tek izgradnjom novog, delotvomog antimonopolskog zakonodavstva i obezbeđivanjem njegovog nepristrasnog i efikasnog sprovođenja biće pružena neophodna podrška drugim segmentima procesa tranzicije u našoj privredi, a pre svega privatizatizaciji. English. The paper provides suggestions and guideline for the new competition policy legislation. The suggestions are based on the analysis of the current federal antitrust legislation and its shortcomings. The new legislation must tackle the following main issues: creation of market power (monopoly and other noncompetitive market structures, the effects of horizontal and vertical mergers to market structures, and establishment of appropriate antitrust institution (commission), with precisely defined authorities, responsibilities, decision-making criteria and procedures , election procedures and mandates of every member of the commission, and strictly enforced principle of the transparent operations of the commission. It is necessary to avoid the room for the provision of the actual antitrust legislation that "prominent businessmen" should be the commissionaires: hence to regulate themselves. The establishment of the new, effective antitrust legislation and its unbiased and efficient enforcement will provide solid base for the competition policy, which in tum will provide support to other segments of transition of Yug oslav economy , first of all to the priva1isation process.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Competition policy: A suggestion
• Language: Serbian
• Keywords: konkurencija, monopol , antimonopolsko zakonodavstvo, tržišne strukture, tržišna moć competition, monopoly, antitrust legislation , market structures, market power
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D40 - General; K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law > K20 - General; K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law > K21 - Antitrust Law; L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies > L40 - General

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