An economic approach on imprisonment of second-instance convicts: the case of Brazil

Justus, Marcelo and Conti, Thomas Victor (2017): An economic approach on imprisonment of second-instance convicts: the case of Brazil. Published in: Economic Analysis of Law Review , Vol. 8, No. 1 (2 August 2017): pp. 277-290.

Abstract

On October 5, 2016, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court decided that imprisonment of convicts in second-instance before the res judicata does not affect article 283 of the Penal Code. The objective of this study is to analyze, without judging the constitutionality of the novel juridical act, the hypothesis that “the possibility of imprisonment of convicts in second instance was a correct decision to reduce crime and its social cost”. This hypothesis is not rejected pursuant to the economic theory of crime.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Deterrence effect; Law and economics; Social cost
• Subjects: K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior; K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K41 - Litigation Process; K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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