Constitutional instability and Poverty: Some Empirical Evidence

Kodila-Tedika, Oasis and Mulunda Kabange, Martin (2018): Constitutional instability and Poverty: Some Empirical Evidence.

Abstract

Is constitution linked to poverty difference between countries? In this article, we attempt to answer this question. We gather ideas of the temporal incoherence and the utility functions of political entrepreneurs. We have established a positive strong link between the constitutional instability, and poverty. The more a country changes its constitution, the higher the level of poverty.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Poverty, Constitutional instability
• Subjects: I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I3 - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O38 - Government Policy; P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems > P16 - Political Economy

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