Mao, Liang (2017): Designing International Environmental Agreements under Participation Uncertainty.
Preview |
PDF
MPRA_paper_86248.pdf Download (343kB) | Preview |
Abstract
We analyze the design of international environmental agreement (IEA) by a three-stage coalition formation game. In stage one, a designer chooses an IEA rule which, depending on the coalition of signatories formed in stage two, specifies the action that each signatory should take in stage three. A certain degree of participation uncertainty exists in that each country intending to sign the IEA for its best interest has a probability to end up a non-signatory. An IEA rule is said to be optimal if it maximizes the expected payoff of each signatory. We provide an algorithm to determine an optimal rule, and show its advantage over some rules used in the literature.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
---|---|
Original Title: | Designing International Environmental Agreements under Participation Uncertainty |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | International environmental agreement; coalition formation; participation uncertainty, stable coalition |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q54 - Climate ; Natural Disasters and Their Management ; Global Warming |
Item ID: | 86248 |
Depositing User: | Dr. Liang Mao |
Date Deposited: | 18 Apr 2018 10:37 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 17:11 |
References: | Barrett, S., 1994. Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxford Economic Papers 46, 878–894. Carraro, C., Marchiori, C., Oreffice, S., 2009. Endogenous minimum participation in international environmental treaties. Environmental and Resource Economics 42, 411–425. Carraro, C., Siniscalco, D., 1993. Strategies for the international protection of the environment. Journal of Public Economics 52, 309–328. Cazals, A., Sauquet, A., 2015. How do elections affect international cooperation? Evidence from environmental treaty participation. Public Choice 162, 263–285. Chander, P., Tulkens, H., 1997. The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities. International Journal of Game Theory 26, 379–401. d’Aspremont, C., Jacquemin, A., Gabszewicz, J.J., Weymark, J., 1983. On the stability of collusive price leadership. Canadian Journal of Economics 16, 17–25. Dellink, R., Finus, M., Olieman, N., 2008. The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement. Environmental and Resource Economics 39, 357–377. Finus, M., 2001. Game theory and international environmental cooperation. Edward Elgar. Hong, F., Karp, L., 2014. International environmental agreements with endogenous or exogenous risk. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 1, 365–394. Katz, M.L., 1986. An analysis of cooperative research and development. The RAND Journal of Economics 17, 527–543. Kellenberg, D., Levinson, A., 2014. Waste of effort? International environmental agreements. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 1, 135–169. Köke, S., Lange, A., 2017. Negotiating environmental agreements under ratification constraints. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 83, 90–106. Kolstad, C., 2007. Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 53, 68–79. Kuiper, J., Olaizola, N., 2008. A dynamic approach to cartel formation. International Journal of Game Theory 37, 397–408. Masoudi, N., Santugini, M., Zaccour, G., 2016. A dynamic game of emissions pollution with uncertainty and learning. Environmental and Resource Economics 64, 349–372. Masoudi, N., Zaccour, G., 2017. Adapting to climate change: Is cooperation good for the environment? Economics Letters 153, 1–5. Miller, S., Nkuiya, B., 2016. Coalition formation in fisheries with potential regime shift. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 79, 189–207. Poyago-Theotoky, J., 1995. Equilibrium and optimal size of a research joint venture in an oligopoly with spillovers. Journal of Industrial Economics 43, 209–226. Ray, D., Vohra, R., 2001. Coalitional power and public goods. Journal of Political Economy 109, 1355–1384. Thoron, S., 1998. Formation of a coalition-proof stable cartel. Canadian Journal of Economics 31, 63–76. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/86248 |