Reciprocity Reciprocity in Climate Coalition Formationin Climate Coalition Formation

Lin, Yu-Hsuan (2018): Reciprocity Reciprocity in Climate Coalition Formationin Climate Coalition Formation.

Abstract

This study investigates the impact of reciprocal altruistic attitudes on individual willingness to participate in a climate coalition with experimental evidences. The theoretical result suggested that the scope of the coalition’s formation could be enlarged by the participation of altruists. However, we found that a kind participant in the altruism test could behave unkindly to others in the public good game. Considering attitudes against reciprocal altruism, when participants thought they were being treated badly, they were more likely to join a coalition because of the threat of punishment. In contrast, when participants were noncritical to a coalition, such altruistic attitudes were insignificant to their decisions. This result implies that decisions in international conventions are not self-enforced. Overall, this study reveals that self-interest remains the key factor influencing individual participation in climate coalitions. Coalition formation can also be affected by reciprocal altruistic preferences.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: social preference, experimental design, reciprocity, altruism, international environmental agreements
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy; H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q54 - Climate ; Natural Disasters and Their Management ; Global Warming

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