Consoli, Andrea and Spagano, Salvatore (2008): La leva istituzionale dell’autonomia: un freno allo sviluppo locale?
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Abstract
The following paper deals with a particular feature of local government within the italian institutional system by using the usual methods of economic analysis. It shows the possibility for regional authorities to reduce, delay or even obstruct the results that national policies can produce. If national policies liberalize a given economic sector, the rules protecting local identity may cause loss of welfare. This happens when regional administrators have the opportunity to reap a part of (or all) the monopolistic rent through their public positions. This work refers to the rules of the constitutional law that the Sicilian region has recently exploited.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | La leva istituzionale dell’autonomia: un freno allo sviluppo locale? |
Language: | Italian |
Subjects: | H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations |
Item ID: | 8747 |
Depositing User: | Andrea Consoli |
Date Deposited: | 14 May 2008 06:50 |
Last Modified: | 29 Sep 2019 04:39 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/8747 |