The Influence of Reciprocity on Individual Decisions in An Experiment

Lin, Yu-Hsuan (2018): The Influence of Reciprocity on Individual Decisions in An Experiment.

Abstract

This study investigates the effect of reciprocal kindness on individual decisions with experimental evidences. The literature suggested that the coalition formation could be enlarged by altruism. This study employs the reciprocity model to illustrate the reciprocal behavior in both dictator and public goods games. We found that an altruistic participant in the dictator game could be hostile to others in the public good game due to the negative reciprocal feeling. When subjects were essential to make contributions to public goods, they were more likely to cooperate if they were treated badly. In contrast, when subjects were unnecessary, the reciprocal kindness could enhance cooperative tendencies. Overall, this study reveals that the reciprocal behavior could reshape the provision of public goods.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: experimental design, reciprocity, public goods; dictator game
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy; H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods

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