Walrasian Solutions Without Utility Functions

Dominique, C-Rene (2008): Walrasian Solutions Without Utility Functions.

Abstract

SUMMARY:

This note reviews consumers’ preference orderings in economics and shows that irrationality is a poor explanation for apparent violations of some axioms of order. Apparent violations seem to be better explained by the fact that consumers’ utility functions, if they exist at all, might not even belong to the class of quasi-concave functions. However, the main task of markets is the determination of equilibrium price vectors. The note shows in addition that, in Walrasian structures, quasi-concave utility functions are unnecessary for the determination of equilibrium price vectors.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Walrasian structures, preference orderings, irrationality, utility functions, and equilibrium price vectors
• Subjects: A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics; A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A10 - General; A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A14 - Sociology of Economics

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