Constitution, Institutions and A Model for Economic Development in Nepal

Bhattarai, Keshab (2015): Constitution, Institutions and A Model for Economic Development in Nepal.

Abstract

Nepal made significant progress in removing monarchy and terrors of Maoists in the last decade. It however lacks a stable solution for speedier economic growth and development as the major political parties are still struggling to institutionalize the new political framework set up by the new constitution of Nepal that was promulgated by the Constitution Assembly of Nepal (CAN-II ) for the federal democratic republic of Nepal on 20 September 2015. Nepalese economy crippled by the terrible earthquake of April 2015 got further paralyzed by the undeclared blockade from India that was afraid of separatist movements in southern Nepal. NC led government managed to conduct free and fair elections of central, provincial and local governments by the end of 2017 in which the NCP, a new allaince of communist CPN-UML and CPN-Maoist parties was able to secure the absolute majority based on radical manifesto promises relegating the NC to a weak opposition. The NCP government has however failed totally to implement its promises in practice bringing inclusive programmes suitable to multi-ethnic, multi-climatic and multi-cultural and multi-linguistic economy and society. Corruption has spread further from the top to the bottom. Quality of institutions, leadership and the governance has further deteriorated. Faster growth and economic growth and development is not possible unless the new system sticks to a dynamic model for a decentralized economy updating beliefs that can improve the well-being of people and transform Nepal into a modern, vibrant, and market oriented dynamic economy. Nepal should avoid economically and topographically unrealistic trans-Himalayan trade-efforts with China and should improve mutual and natural understanding and cooperation with India to sustain growth in the long run.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: constitution, institution, Nepal, economic growth and development
• Subjects: O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O5 - Economywide Country Studies; P - Economic Systems > P3 - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions > P37 - Legal Institutions ; Illegal Behavior; P - Economic Systems > P5 - Comparative Economic Systems

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