Statuts juridiques, gouvernance et performance des institutions de microfinance au Cameroun

DJOUFOUET, Wulli Faustin (2018): Statuts juridiques, gouvernance et performance des institutions de microfinance au Cameroun.

Abstract

The main objective of this article is to analyse the impact of governance mechanisms in general and their interactions in particular on the performance of microfinance institutions while taking into account their legal forms. To achieve this objective, a multiple regression was carried out on a sample of 62 microfinance institutions whose data collected covers a period from 2009 to 2015. Our results show that large boards of directors do not add value to governance in microfinance co-ops. Private microfinance institutions, on the other hand, need to have a large board in order to benefit from a multiplicity of skills and increase staff productivity. Second-tier microfinance institutions that want to increase the productivity of their staff must review the number of women on their boards. They need to redefine their recruitment and compensation policies.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Legal status, governance and performance of microfinance institutions in Cameroon
• Language: French
• Keywords: Microfinance, interactions, financial performance, governance
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G0 - General > G00 - General; G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services

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