Sharing the revenues from broadcasting sport events

Bergantiños, Gustavo and Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. (2018): Sharing the revenues from broadcasting sport events. Forthcoming in: Management Science

Abstract

We study the problem of sharing the revenue from broadcasting sport events, among participating players. We provide direct, axiomatic and game-theoretical foundations for two focal rules: the equal-split rule and concede-and-divide. The former allocates the revenues generated from broadcasting each game equally among the participating players in the game. The latter concedes players in each game the revenues generated by their respective fans and divides equally the residual. We also provide an application studying the case of sharing the revenue from broadcasting games in La Liga, the Spanish Football League. We show that hybrid schemes, combining our rules with lower bounds and performance measures, yield close outcomes to the current allocation being implemented by the Spanish National Professional Football League Association.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: resource allocation, broadcasting, sport events, concede-and-divide, Shapley value.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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