Stone, Joe A. and Jacobs, David (2019): Presidential party affiliation and electoral cycles in the U.S.economy: evidence from party changes in adjacent terms.
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Abstract
Unique evidence presented in this study challenges previous findings about presidential politics and business cycles. Prior studies find strong evidence for a Democratic economic growth advantage of about 1.8 percent per year over the course of a term but only weak evidence for a pre- election surge in growth for incumbent Presidents of either party. This study finds a much smaller Democratic advantage and strong evidence for a pre-election growth surge for Republican Presidents relative to Democratic Presidents. The novelty of these results is attributable to the use of repeated party-change reversals in adjacent terms for identification in place of binary changes in isolated terms separated by as much as a half-century in prior studies. We find a strongly partisan Federal Reserve effect on growth as well. Results are insensitive to an extensive battery of robustness checks including a placebo test.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Presidential party affiliation and electoral cycles in the U.S.economy: evidence from party changes in adjacent terms. |
English Title: | Presidential party affiliation and electoral cycles in the U.S.economy: evidence from party changes in adjacent terms. |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | political business cycles; Presidents; Economic Growth |
Subjects: | E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E60 - General H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies |
Item ID: | 96064 |
Depositing User: | Joe/A. Stone |
Date Deposited: | 22 Sep 2019 09:56 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 22:41 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/96064 |