Optimal dynamic antitrust fines

Merino Troncoso, Carlos (2019): Optimal dynamic antitrust fines.

Abstract

Standard antitrust optimal fines rely on a microeconomic static model. Motchenkova describes optimal antitrust dynamic sanctions and their application for EU and US methodology. For the EU fine, and based on this methodology, we find an equilibrium point for a high level of offense (2 times normal profits ) and a high detection probability (0.6).

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: antitrust,cartel,differential games
• Subjects: K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law > K21 - Antitrust Law; L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies

References

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