Stigma model of welfare fraud and non-take-up: Theory and evidence from OECD panel data

Kurita, Kenichi and Hori, Nobuaki and Katafuchi, Yuya (2019): Stigma model of welfare fraud and non-take-up: Theory and evidence from OECD panel data.

Abstract

This paper tries to challenge two puzzles in the welfare benefit program. The first puzzle is non-take-up welfare which means poor people do not take-up welfare even though they are approved to take-up. Second, empirical evidence suggests that there may exist the inverse U-shaped relationship between benefit level and beneficiary ratio. We present a model of welfare stigma as a hypothesis to explain the above puzzles. Specifically, we investigate the statistical discrimination view model. Results are summarized as the relationship between two types of elasticity.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Stigma, Take-up, Minimum income guarantee, OECD panel data, Poverty
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents > H31 - Household; H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs; I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I3 - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty > I38 - Government Policy ; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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