Two-worker competition in gift-exchange: assessing intention-based reciprocity and inequity aversion

Bogliacino, Francesco and Rodríguez González, Nicolás (2020): Two-worker competition in gift-exchange: assessing intention-based reciprocity and inequity aversion.

Abstract

In this article, we study a three-person gift exchange, where two workers compete for a bonus. We derive the equilibrium properties of the models of sequential reciprocity and inequity aversion. We then prove a comparative statics theorem, when one worker becomes more productive. We show that compared with the predictions of outcome based model, those of the intention based model contrast sharply. This creates an ideal setting in which to perform a controlled experiment to test them. Our results largely support sequential reciprocity.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Gift exchange; sequential reciprocity; inequity aversion
• Subjects: A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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