Steinbacher, Matej and Steinbacher, Matjaz and Steinbacher, Mitja (2009): To Work or Not? Simulating Inspection Game with Labor Unions.
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The model of social network is used to analyze the impact of the power of labor unions in the labor relations. We find that labor union capable to affect a pecuniary compensation of shirking employees lessens the motivation of employees to work and improve to the unionization rate. As a result, the performance of the firm is significantly deteriorated and its existence endangered. On the other hand, the inspection proved to be a successful method for “motivating” employees to work. By using non-omniscient agents, we also estimated the cost of that non-omniscience, which proved to be significant in all cases.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||To Work or Not? Simulating Inspection Game with Labor Unions|
|Keywords:||social networks, inspection game, evolutionary games|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining > J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology > Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
|Depositing User:||Matjaz Steinbacher|
|Date Deposited:||23. Feb 2009 14:27|
|Last Modified:||12. Mar 2015 01:08|
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