Antoci, Angelo and Galeotti, Marcello and Geronazzo, Lucio (2007): Visitor and firm taxes versus environmental options in a dynamical context. Published in: Journal of Applied Mathematics , Vol. Articl, No. Volume 2007 : pp. 1-15.
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The main objective of the paper is to analyze the effects on economic agents’ behavior deriving from the introduction of financial activities aimed to environmental protection. The environmental protection mechanism we study should permit exchange of financial activities among citizens, firms, and Public Administration. Such a particular “financial market” is regulated by the Public Administration, but mainly fuelled by the interest of two classes of involved agents: firms and dwelling citizens. We assume that the adoption process of financial decisions is described by a two-population evolutionary game and we study the basic features of the resulting dynamics.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Visitor and firm taxes versus environmental options in a dynamical context|
|Keywords:||Environmental options; environment preserving technologies; evolutionary games; tourism|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D53 - Financial Markets
G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G11 - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation > Q28 - Government Policy
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation > Q20 - General
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
|Depositing User:||Angelo Antoci|
|Date Deposited:||28. Feb 2009 11:49|
|Last Modified:||18. Feb 2013 04:20|
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