Andrikopoulos, Athanasios (2009): Szpilrajntype theorems in economics.

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Abstract
The Szpilrajn "constructive type" theorem on extending binary relations, or its generalizations by Dushnik and Miller [10], is one of the best known theorems in social sciences and mathematical economics. Arrow [1], Fishburn [11], Suzumura [22], Donaldson and Weymark [8] and others utilize Szpilrajn's Theorem and the Wellordering principle to obtain more general "existence type" theorems on extending binary relations. Nevertheless, we are generally interested not only in the existence of linear extensions of a binary relation R, but in something more: the conditions of the preference sets and the properties which $R$ satisfies to be "inherited" when one passes to any member of some \textquotedblleft interesting\textquotedblright family of linear extensions of R. Moreover, in extending a preference relation $R$, the problem will often be how to incorporate some additional preference data with a minimum of disruption of the existing structure or how to extend the relation so that some desirable new condition is fulfilled. The key to addressing these kinds of problems is the szpilrajn constructive method. In this paper, we give two general "constructive type" theorems on extending binary relations, a Szpilrajn type and a DushnikMiller type theorem, which generalize and give a "constructive type" version of all the well known extension theorems in the literature.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Szpilrajntype theorems in economics 
English Title:  Szpilrajntype theorems in economics 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Consistent binary consistent binary relations, extension theorems, intersection of binary relations 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D71  Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations D  Microeconomics > D6  Welfare Economics > D60  General D  Microeconomics > D0  General > D00  General C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6  Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C60  General 
Item ID:  14345 
Depositing User:  Andrikopoulos 
Date Deposited:  30. Mar 2009 02:02 
Last Modified:  16. Feb 2013 14:31 
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URI:  http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/14345 