Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Enforcement of Regulation, Irregular Sector, and Firm Performance

Bonaventura, Luigi and Orlando, Danilo (2007): Enforcement of Regulation, Irregular Sector, and Firm Performance.

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Abstract

In this paper we investigate how enforcement of regulation affects the size of irregular sector, firm perfomance and the exit rate to the market. Three kinds of enforcement policy will be tested in the model: control, punish and legitimacy. The first policy is based on the number of inspectors present in the economy; the second is defined by the magnitude of punish; the third is measured by the social legitimacy. Our results show the negligible influence of control to enforce irregularity; the strong effect of punish on irregular sector with a high exit rate; the good effect of legitimacy policy in promoting regularity with a low output performance.

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