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How do the social norms sustain?

Singh, Indervir (2009): How do the social norms sustain? Unpublished.

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Abstract

The present study attempts to provide reasons for sustainability of social norms. Here, the people are considered as competitors, where everyone tries to improve his position in the society by proving himself better than others. In this situation, a person has an incentive to punish the rule breaker as well as people related to him, if the breaking of rule gives him opportunity to improve his position by punishing them. Further, the people related to the rule breaker have incentive to punish him if they can reduce the extent their punishment by doing so. A person may also use the punishment activity for gains if people who have internalized the norm pay him for his services in different ways due to their conscience. In addition, the conditions for the taking up the punishment activity are also worked out.

Item Type:MPRA Paper
Language:English
Keywords:Social norms, sustainability, emotions and competition.
Subjects:D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology > Z13 - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks
ID Code:18404
Deposited By:Mr Indervir Singh
Deposited On:06. Nov 2009 06:49
Last Modified:11. Nov 2009 09:50
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