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A formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic Voting Models characterized by Single Mindedness

Canegrati, Emanuele (2007): A formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic Voting Models characterized by Single Mindedness. Unpublished.

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Abstract

This work intends to specify a formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic Voting Models with Single Mindedness Theory. The goal is to find an equivalent expression to the Ramsey’s rule for a political economy environment where Governments are assumed to be Leviathans rather than benevolents.

Item Type:MPRA Paper
Additional Information:please do not quote
Language:English
Keywords:probabilistic voting model; single mindedness theory; optimal taxation; positive approach
Subjects:D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I3 - Welfare and Poverty > I38 - Government Policy; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H - Public Economics > H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents > H31 - Household
H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H27 - Other Sources of Revenue
H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
ID Code:1896
Deposited By:Emanuele Canegrati
Deposited On:24. Feb 2007
Last Modified:07. Nov 2007 02:05
References:

[1] Ambrosanio M. F., Bordignon M., Galmarini U. & Panteghini P.: Lezioni di Teoria delle imposte, (1997), ETAS Libri [2] Brennan G. & Buchanan J.M: The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution, (1980) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [3] Ramsey F.P.: A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, (1927) Economic Journal, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 47-61

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