Miklos-Thal, Jeanine and Ullrich, Hannes (2010): Effort Incentives in Nomination Contests: Evidence from Professional Soccer.
This is the latest version of this item.
In many situations, agents compete for a fixed number of attractive positions awarded on the basis of the agents' relative perceived abilities. Economic theory predicts that agents' effort incentives in such contests depend non-monotonically on their anticipated winning chances, but empirical evidence is lacking. We use panel data to study soccer players' responses to the informal contests for being on a national team participating in the 2008 Euro Cup. The control group consists of players who work for the same clubs but are nationals of countries that did not participate in the Euro Cup. We find that contest participation has substantial positive effects on the performances of players with intermediate chances of being nominated for their national team. Players whose nomination is close to certain perform worse than otherwise, particularly in dimensions that carry a high injury risk. For players without any recent national team appearances, we find no significant effects.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Effort Incentives in Nomination Contests: Evidence from Professional Soccer|
|Keywords:||incentives; effort; contests; career concerns; relative reputational concerns|
|Subjects:||J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J4 - Particular Labor Markets > J44 - Professional Labor Markets; Occupational Licensing
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting > M5 - Personnel Economics > M51 - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
|Depositing User:||Jeanine Miklós-Thal|
|Date Deposited:||19. Nov 2010 16:39|
|Last Modified:||11. Feb 2013 11:40|
Allison, Paul D. andWaterman, Richard P. (2002), "Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regression Models", Sociological Methodology, Vol. 32, pp. 247-265.
Becker, Brian E. and Huselid, Mark A. (1992), "The Incentive Effects of Tournament Compensation Schemes", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 37, pp. 336-350.
Bertrand, Marianne, Duflo, Esther, and Mullainathan, Sendhil (2004), "How Much Should We Trust Differences- in-Differences Estimates?", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, No. 1, pp. 249-275
Brown, Jennifer (2010), "Quitters Never Win: The (Adverse) Incentive Effects of Competing with Superstars", working paper, Kellogg, Northwestern University.
Duggan, Mark and Levitt, Steven D. (2002), "Winning Isn't Everything: Corruption in Sumo Wrestling", American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 5, pp. 1594-1605.
Ehrenberg, Ronald G. and Bognanno, Michael L. (1990), "Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 6, pp. 1307-1324.
Effinger, Matthias R. and Polborn, Mattias K. (2001), "Herding and anti-herding: A model of reputational differentiation", European Economic Review, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 385-403.
Franke, Jörg (2010), "The Incentive Effects of Leveling the Playing Field - An Empirical Analysis of Amateur Golf Tournaments", working paper, TU Dortmund.
Garicano, Luís and Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio (2006), "Sabotage in Tournaments: Making the Beautiful Game a Bit Less Beautiful", working paper, London School of Economics.
Guimarães, Paulo (2008), "The Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Model Revisited", Economics Letters, Vol. 99, No. 1, pp. 63-66.
Hausman, Jerry, Hall, Bronwyn H. and Griliches, Zvi (1984), "Economic Models for Count Data with an Application to the Patents' R&D Relationship", Econometrica, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 909-938.
Höffler, Felix and Sliwka, Dirk (2003), "Do New Brooms Sweep Clean? When and Why Dismissing a Manager Increases the Subordinates' Performance", European Economic Review, Vol. 47, pp. 877-890.
Holmström, Bengt (1982), "Managerial Incentive Schemes: A Dynamic Perspective", in: Essays in economics and management in honour of Lars Wahlbeck (Swenska Handelshogkolan, Helsinki, Finnland). Reprinted in: Review of Economic Studies (1999), Vol. 66, pp. 169-182.
Knoeber, Charles R. and Thurman,Walter N. (1994), "Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production", Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 155-179.
Lazear, Edward P. (1989), "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97, No. 3, pp. 561-580.
Lazear, Edward P. and Rosen, Sherwin (1981), "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, No. 5, pp. 841-864.
Meyer, Margaret A. (1991), "Learning from Coarse Information: Biased Contests and Career Profi�les", Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58, pp. 15-41.
Meyer, Margaret A. (1992), "Biased Contests and Moral Hazard: Implications for Career Pro�files", Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, Vol. 25/26, pp. 165-187.
Miguel, Edward, Saiegh, Sebastián M. and Satyanath, Shanker (2008), "National Cultures and Soccer Violence", NBER Working Paper No. W13968.
Orszag, Jonathan M. (1994), "A New Look at Incentive Effects and Golf Tournaments", Economics Letters, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 77-88.
Ottaviani, Marco and Sørensen, Peter N. (2006), "Reputational Cheap Talk", Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 155-175.
Prendergast, Canice (1999), "The Provision of Incentives in Firms", Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 71, No. 5, pp. 7-63.
Rosen, Edward (1986), "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments", American Economic Review, Vol. 76, No. 4, pp. 701-715.
Sunde, Uwe (2009), "Potential, Prizes and Performance: Testing Tournament Theory with Professional Tennis Data", Applied Economics, Vol. 41, No. 25, pp. 3199-3208.
Available Versions of this Item
Effort in Nomination Contests: Evidence from Professional Soccer. (deposited 11. Aug 2010 01:05)
- Effort Incentives in Nomination Contests: Evidence from Professional Soccer. (deposited 19. Nov 2010 16:39) [Currently Displayed]