Kumabe, Masahiro and Mihara, H. Reiju (2011): Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixtyfour possibilities. Forthcoming in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
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Abstract
Classify simple games into sixteen "types" in terms of the four conventional axioms: monotonicity, properness, strongness, and nonweakness. Further classify them into sixtyfour classes in terms of finiteness (existence of a ﬁnite carrier) and algorithmic computability. For each such class, we either show that it is empty or give an example of a game belonging to it. We observe that if a type contains an inﬁnite game, then it contains both computable ones and noncomputable ones. This strongly suggests that computability is logically, as well as conceptually, unrelated to the conventional axioms.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixtyfour possibilities 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Voting games; axiomatic method; complete independence; Turing computability; multicriterion decisionmaking 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71  Cooperative Games D  Microeconomics > D9  Intertemporal Choice and Growth > D90  General D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D71  Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6  Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C69  Other 
Item ID:  29000 
Depositing User:  H. Reiju Mihara 
Date Deposited:  20. Feb 2011 20:21 
Last Modified:  12. Feb 2013 02:27 
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URI:  http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/29000 
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Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixtyfour possibilities. (deposited 13. Oct 2006)

Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixtyfour possibilities. (deposited 09. Aug 2007)
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Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixtyfour possibilities. (deposited 09. Aug 2007)