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A non-cooperative Pareto-efficient solution to a single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma

Wu, Haoyang (2011): A non-cooperative Pareto-efficient solution to a single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma.

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Abstract

The Prisoner's Dilemma is a simple model that captures the essential contradiction between individual rationality and global rationality. Although the single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma is usually viewed simple, in this paper we will propose an algorithmic model and a non-binding scheme to help non-cooperative agents obtain Pareto-efficient payoffs self-enforcingly. The scheme stems from quantum game theory, but is applicable to the macro world immediately.

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