Jing-Yuan, Chiou (2012): In the shadow of giants.
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Intellectual giants provide broad shoulders for subsequent inventors. Their unfinished inquiry, however, also casts shadow on the prospect of future research. This paper incorporates this shadow effect into a two-stage innovation process and shows that patenting the first-stage result (the basic invention) may enhance the second-stage innovation. It is optimal to reject patent protection to the basic invention only when this beneficial effect does not arise, and when it is essential to preserve the pioneering inventor's incentive to continue research activities.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||In the shadow of giants|
|Keywords:||Cumulative Innovation; Patentable Subject Matter; Probabilistic Patents; Search; Shadow Effect|
|Subjects:||O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
K - Law and Economics > K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law > K39 - Other
|Depositing User:||Jing-Yuan Chiou|
|Date Deposited:||03. Mar 2012 19:17|
|Last Modified:||12. Apr 2015 09:30|
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