Jellal, Mohamed and Bouzahzah, Mohamed (2012): Corruption and tax evasion an optimal policy.
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Under Principal-Agent-Supervisor paradigm, we examine in this paper how a tax collection agency changes optimal schemes in order to lessen the occurrence of corruption between the tax collector and the taxpayer. The Principal, who maximizes the expected net fiscal revenue, reacts by decreasing tax rates when the supervisor is likely to engage in corrupt transaction with taxpayer.The combat against collusion and corruption may explain the greater reliance on indirect taxes than on direct taxes both in developed and developing countries like Morocco.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Corruption and tax evasion an optimal policy|
|Keywords:||Principal,Supervisor,Agent, Corruption, Tax Evasion|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H26 - Tax Evasion
|Depositing User:||Mohamed Jellal|
|Date Deposited:||15. May 2012 14:13|
|Last Modified:||20. Feb 2013 21:09|
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