Cole, Rebel and Mehran, Hamid (2007): What can we learn from privately held firms about executive compensation?
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This study examines the determinants of CEO compensation using data from a nationally representative sample of privately held U.S. corporations. We find that: (i) the pay-size elasticity is much larger for privately held firms than for the publicly traded firms on which previous research has almost exclusively focused; (ii) executives at C-corporations are paid significantly more than executives at S-corporations; (iii) executive pay is inversely related to CEO ownership; (iv) executive pay is inversely related to leverage; and (v) executive pay is related to a number of CEO characteristics, including age, education and gender. Executive pay is inversely related to CEO age and positively related to educational attainment. Finally, female executives are paid significantly less than their male counterparts.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||What can we learn from privately held firms about executive compensation?|
|Keywords:||Compensation; Organizational Form; Taxes; Ownership; Education; Gende|
|Subjects:||G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H25 - Business Taxes and Subsidies
H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
|Depositing User:||Prof. Rebel Cole|
|Date Deposited:||05. Sep 2007|
|Last Modified:||01. Mar 2013 16:28|