Correa, Sofía and Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo (2013): Essential equilibria of large games.
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Abstract
We characterize essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria for generalized games with a continuum of players. As application, we rationalize the active participation of politically engaged individuals as the unique essential equilibrium in an electoral game with a continuum of Cournot-Nash equilibria.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Essential equilibria of large games |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Essential equilibria; Essential sets and components; Large games |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium |
Item ID: | 48137 |
Depositing User: | Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez |
Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2013 19:18 |
Last Modified: | 13 Oct 2019 07:08 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/48137 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Essential stability for large generalized games. (deposited 13 Feb 2012 16:58)
- Essential equilibria of large games. (deposited 09 Jul 2013 19:18) [Currently Displayed]